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Abstract 
The paper empirically explores how more trade transparency affects market liquidity. The 
analysis takes advantage of a unique setting in which the Shanghai Stock Exchange offered more 
trade transparency to market participants subscribing to a new software package. First, the results 
show that the additional data disclosure increased trading activity, but also increased transactions 
costs through wider bid-ask spreads. Thus, in contrast to popular policy belief, the paper finds that 
more transparency need not improve market liquidity. Second, the paper finds a particularly 
strong immediate liquidity impact accompanied by altered trading behavior, which suggests a 
significant impact on institutional traders subscribing relatively early. Lastly, since the effective 
level of market transparency is bound to depend on how many traders are subscribing to the data, 
the study can empirically establish the functional form between market-wide transparency and 
liquidity. The relationship is non-monotonic, which can explain the lack of consensus in the 
existing literature where each empirical study is naturally confined to specific parts of the 
transparency domain. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Transparency discussions have exacerbated following the financial crisis, making world 
leaders repeatedly call out for more transparency in financial markets.
1
 However, it has not yet 
been established that increased transparency necessarily improves market outcomes. This paper 
examines the extent to which increased pre- and post-trade transparency improves liquidity. 
In August 2006 the Shanghai Stock Exchange introduced a policy change that increased the 
pre- and post-trade information available to market participants. The additional market 
information was provided to any market participant who subscribed to a new computer software 
package named Level II. The paper investigates the effects of this change on trading activity 
(measured by turnover) and trading costs (measured by bid-ask spreads). 
First, the paper quantifies a significant liquidity impact of the one-time increase in pre- and 
post-trade disclosure. The results show that the additional data disclosure increased trading 
activity, but also increased transaction costs through wider bid-ask spreads. The detrimental effect 
directly contrasts the widespread policy view that ‘more is better’ when it comes to trade 
transparency. Instead, the results conform to a more multivariate approach to transparency design, 
which ultimately depends on the level of transparency already in place in the individual setting. 
Second, it is of specific interest to examine what impact the transparency change has had on 
major institutional traders, who not only have the most at stake but are presumably also the most 
responsive to any alterations in market conditions and day-to-day trading operations. As major 
traders are relatively more invested and active in the marketplace, it is reasonable to presume that 
institutional traders are among the first group of subscribers. Consistently, an empirical evaluation 
reveals that the bulk of the liquidity impact is immediate and accompanied by altered trading 
behavior, which conforms to major traders being relatively more affected and responding more 
strongly to the transparency change compared to other market players. 
Third, the paper studies the overall liquidity dynamics as the software subscription level rises 
over the sample period. As the effective level of market transparency is bound to depend on how 
many traders can actually access the data, the number of traders having access to the transparency 
enhancing information (a measure provided to us directly from the Shanghai Stock Exchange) 
acts as a time-varying proxy for the implicit level of market-wide transparency. Exploiting this 
time dimension creates a unique possibility to estimate the functional form between trade 
                                                 
1
 For example, the European Union finance ministers have agreed on an overhaul of financial system (endorsed by the 
European Parliament) and the European Commission has introduced rules that will force more disclosure on financial 
markets (The Economist, 2010; Wall Street Journal, 2010). In the U.S. the Dodd-Frank act was passed in July 2010, 
which aims to promote financial stability by e.g. increasing transparency of the financial system. 
3 
 
transparency and liquidity, which has not been possible in existing studies naturally constrained to 
only discrete one-time shifts in transparency. The results show that although the overall liquidity 
impact is clear-cut (higher turnover and wider spreads), the dynamics of such a change are non-
monotonic. This means that the liquidity impact of additional software subscribers can change 
depending on how many market participants already have access. In other words, the same 
transparency change can have different – and even opposite – liquidity outcomes depending on 
effective transparency level already in place.  
This has several implications. First, it reinforces the result that increased transparency may not 
be uniformly welfare improving across all settings, in sharp contrast to prevailing perceptions. 
Second, as markets in general differ in their level and access to market information, this implies 
that any wide reaching policy recommendations on trade transparency cannot be assumed to 
uniformly affect different markets. To take an example, a transparency policy implemented across 
all EU countries can have markedly different liquidity outcomes across member states – both in 
terms of sign and size. Finally, the result that liquidity outcomes vary across pre-existing 
transparency levels can help explain the contrasting results in the existing literature. Namely, as 
each empirical study is bound to evaluate the effect of a transparency change relative to pre-
existing market conditions, the empirical results of the literature may differ because the effective 
transparency level already in place differs across each market being studied – i.e. each study is 
naturally confined to specific parts of the non-monotonic transparency domain. 
Lastly, through a series of attractive features in both the data set and the empirical setting, this 
study improves upon the extent and accuracy to which these relationships can be examined. First, 
the study takes advantage of a ‘near-randomized’ treatment vs. control group allocation. 
Specifically, the transparency effect on Shanghai listed firms is evaluated in relation to a control 
group of Shenzhen listed firms, which were not subject to the policy change. The randomization 
comes from the fact that before September 2000 the Chinese authorities unilaterally allocated 
firms to list at either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchange. This implies that firms cannot 
self-select onto the exchanges. Thus, after controlling for firm location, the absence of a 
systematic mechanism to prescribe firms to either exchange creates an ideal setting, which allows 
for a robust comparison of firm outcomes across exchanges. Second, the Shanghai policy change 
was directly targeted to increase pre- and post-trade transparency and as such it was not 
accompanied by any other market change. The study therefore naturally circumvents challenges 
faced by several existing studies, where numerous (potentially counteracting) policy changes 
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occur simultaneously.
2
 As detailed further in the next section, this offers a ‘cleaner’ estimate of 
the increased transparency effect on liquidity. 
The paper proceeds by providing some background information on the existing literature 
(2.1), the exact transparency changes under study (2.2) and the Chinese stock market structure 
(2.3). Section 3 first introduces the data and sample choice (3.1), followed by a presentation of the 
empirical results showing the overall liquidity results (3.2), the immediate impact associated with 
early subscribers (3.3) and the liquidity dynamics as the subscription level gradually rises (3.4). 
The paper finally establishes the robustness of the results (3.5) and section 4 concludes. 
 
2 Background information 
2.1 Literature review 
The academic literature generally agrees that changed pre- or post-transparency will alter 
market outcomes by changing the behavior of market participants (e.g., Boehmer, Saar and Yu, 
2005; Porter and Weaver, 1998; Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar, 2011). However, there is less 
agreement on the direction of the effect, i.e. whether increased transparency improves or 
deteriorates market quality. For example, both positive and negative effects have been 
demonstrated theoretically in several transparency studies (see e.g. Madhavan, 1995, 1996; Naik, 
Neuberger and Viswanathan, 1999; Baruch, 2005). 
On the empirical side, a handful of studies document a positive link between increased 
transparency and market outcomes. Swan and Westerholm (2006) empirically study 33 major 
stock exchanges and analyze which transparency features and market designs are associated with 
desirable market outcomes, such as high liquidity. They conclude that market designs that favor 
greater (pre- or post-trade) transparency typically outperform more opaque market structures. This 
is in line with a series of recent papers concluding that increased trade transparency will increase 
liquidity (Boehmer, Saar and Yu, 2005; Zhao and Chung, 2007), improve price discovery 
(Hendershott and Jones, 2005), lower volatility (Chung and Chuwonganant, 2007) and ameliorate 
various other market outcomes (Eom, Ok and Park, 2007). 
But despite widespread belief – in particular among policy makers 3  – that increasing 
transparency leads to a fairer and informatively more efficient market, there are empirical studies 
                                                 
2
 As an example, Eom, Ok and Park (2007) study transparency increases on the Korean stock exchange that are 
accompanied by an event which reduces disclosure, which may contaminate any transparency estimates, as is openly 
acknowledged by the authors. 
5 
 
that contrast this (see e.g. Madhavan, Porter and Weaver, 2005). This is particularly true in the 
debate on broker anonymity, where the case against increased pre-trade transparency is prevalent 
(Foucault, Moinas and Theissen, 2007; Simaan, Weaver and Whitcomb, 2003; Comerton-Forde, 
Frino and Mollica, 2005; Desgranges and Foucault, 2005; Rindi, 2008). The benefits of increased 
post-trade transparency have similarly been questioned in several studies that do not find that 
changes in the data publication regime – such as changed timing of reporting – leads to liquidity 
improvements (Gemmill, 1996; Saporta, Trebeschi and Vila, 1999; Board and Sutcliffe, 1995). 
In short, there is no clear consensus in the existing literature on the exact liquidity impact of 
increased pre- and post-trade transparency. However, it is possible that the lack of consensus 
results from strictly examining discrete events, which can produce different outcomes due to 
inevitably different transparency levels within each empirical setting. As previously described, 
this study addresses this issue by introducing a time-varying proxy for the effective level of 
transparency (number of data users), which allows for an evaluation of how liquidity improves or 
deteriorates for a range of different transparency levels. 
2.2 Transparency changes 
The Level II data package introduces five pre- and post-trade transparency changes on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. These are detailed in Table 1, where the most significant pre-
transparency change is listed first (volume individually detailed) and the most notable post-
transparency change is listed last (every transaction documented). More specifically, the primary 
Level II change in pre-trade transparency is to break down the total volume available at the top 
bid and ask quotes. This means that rather than only displaying total volume (the depth of the 
order book at the best quote), now the total number and the average size of requests/offers at the 
best bid/ask are reported. Moreover, the individual volume of the first 50 requests/offers to arrive 
at the best bid/ask (which coincides with the execution order) are detailed with Level II. This level 
of volume requested/offered by individual traders can be argued to reveal some of their 
characteristics; in particular, it helps to infer whether they are small (retail) or big (institutional) 
market participants. Thus, this implies a lower degree of anonymity.
4
 Second, the Level II 
                                                                                                                                                               
3
 For example, both the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 1994) and the Office of Fair 
Trading in the UK (Carsberg, 1994) have repeatedly through time called for increases in transparency as a way to 
improve market quality. 
4
 This is explicitly argued by the suppliers of the software in their commercial leaflets for Level II, i.e. that one may 
use this detailed information on volume to infer if a trader is an institutional/big investor or an individual/small 
investor. In particular, small traders are typically thought of as relatively uninformed investors, whereas big 
(institutional) traders are classified as informed. Thus, although the Level II software does not explicitly provide 
traders’ identities, it nevertheless reduces the degree of anonymity. See for example the website of the largest Level II 
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software increases the number of bid and ask quotes reported to market participants. Instead of 
only the best 5 bid/ask quotes formerly being available, the best 10 bid/ask quotes become visible 
to subscribers of the Level II data software. Thus the depth of reporting increases. Third, bid/ask 
withdrawals are now reported for the 10 stocks that experience the highest number of such 
withdrawals. Before Level II, no such cancellation data was reported.  
The Level II data also introduces two post-trade transparency changes. First, trading 
information is now updated more frequently, i.e. trading data is now updated every 3 seconds 
instead of every 6 seconds. This lowers the time arrival uncertainty faced by traders on submitted 
orders. Specifically, when placing a market order at the prevailing price, this change reduces the 
time until the realized transaction price is revealed. In modern automated markets such changes 
may have considerable effects on market outcomes.
5
 Last but not least, with the Level II software 
every transaction that occurred in the last 3 seconds is now noted and reported (volume, price and 
parties involved), instead of only the last transaction price and total trading in the last 6 seconds. 
This last change, together with the individual pre-trade volume reporting described above (i.e. the 
combination of changes listed first and last in Table 1), constitutes a considerable altercation, 
since this makes it in principle possible to integrate out information on both order placement and 
trading behavior of individual traders. Extracting such information could help to identify order 
placement and trading strategies of different market players, for example whether anyone may be 
building up positions in specific stocks.
6
 Whether the potential for extracting such information has 
had a realized impact on market liquidity is the empirical question hand (section 3.2). Also, the 
overall result of the introduction of Level II – that order and trading behavior is generally more 
difficult to conceal – is likely of most relevance for major traders. Thus, we also specifically study 
how these changes are likely to alter the behavior of major traders and the corresponding effect it 
has on market liquidity (section 3.3). 
Overall, the Level II data package therefore introduces pre- and post-trade transparency 
changes that considerably expand the information space. Additionally, two other aspects of the 
setting are worth mentioning. First, the analysis greatly benefits from the fact that all transparency 
                                                                                                                                                               
software retailer: http://product.gw.com.cn/level2.html (in Chinese). Partial information is also available on Level II 
in English: http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en/c05/c03/c01/c01/p1074/c1505030101_p1074.shtml. For the 2
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best bid-ask quotes only the total volume is reported (which was also true at the best bid/ask quote before the 
introduction of Level II). 
5
 For example, in a recent study, Hendershott and Moulton (2011) show that reducing execution time by 10 seconds 
increases adverse selection and thereby results in wider bid-ask spreads, which is consistent with the results presented 
in section 3.2. 
6
 We thank Joel Hasbrouck for sharpening our notion of these implications. Additionally, it can be argued that the 
Level II data allows for identifying the most profitable traders, but any such learning would inevitably take 
considerable time (say, at least 1-2 years). 
7 
 
changes go in the same direction, i.e. they are designed to increase transparency and are therefore 
very unlikely to counteract each other in any way. The Level II data package also does not replace 
any reported information in the existing transparency regime, but simply provides additional 
information beyond what was previously available. Thus, the introduction of Level II provides a 
‘clean’ event setting naturally circumventing the challenges faced by existing literature where 
counteracting events have been difficult to disentangle (see e.g. Kim, Ok and Park, 2007). 
Second, as described above, the introduction of Level II includes both pre- and post-transparency 
changes. Although this has a clear advantage – since it implies that the study analyzes broad and 
overall transparency changes – it also comes with the shortcoming that it is not possible to 
separate the Level II effect into pre- vs. post-transparency implications. 
Lastly, the data dissemination of the Level II data occurs through private software suppliers. 
More specifically, private software companies buy the Level II trading data from the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, repackage it and supply it to investors through their own software program.
7
 
Only those who buy such software can get access to the Level II data details. The Shanghai Stock 
Exchange charges each private software supplier a royalty for every additional user of their 
software – and thus the Shanghai Stock Exchange compiles the number of subscribers of all Level 
II software packages available (this number is provided to us directly for the purpose of this 
study). All in all this supply side of the Level II data package resembles a market of perfect 
competition. The fundamental product is the same across all suppliers (same data) and in principle 
it can only differ in terms of packaging (in practice, however, the software interface across 
different suppliers looks very similar). These suppliers actively compete with each other to attract 
customers, which makes it possible to gain access to the Level II data at a moderate price. The 
software price is about $200 per annum and thus it is affordable to both institutional and 
individual investors. 
2.3 Stock market structure 
There are two major trading venues in China, namely the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange is China‘s largest exchange and at the end of the 2004-09 sample 
period it listed 870 firms with a market capitalization of $2.7 trillion, compared to 830 firms listed 
in Shenzhen with a market capitalization of $0.9 trillion. Both exchanges play an important role in 
China’s modern and advanced financial system, e.g. the financial services in Shanghai provide 
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 This supply side fragmentation partially explains the gradual allocation of the software, since not all investors may 
be able to buy the software simultaneously. Similarly, on the demand side, there might be incomplete information 
with regards to the availability of Level II and its usefulness. 
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200,000 people with jobs (2.2% of city total) and contributes 8% towards the country’s GDP (The 
Economist, 2007).
8
 The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges are fully government operated 
with streamlined market and trading characteristics. This alignment applies to e.g. trading hours, 
market design and regulations. Table 2 illustrates this by outlining the key features of the market 
microstructure in both exchanges (Panel A). Moreover, Table 2 also shows that investors on the 
two venues face very similar trading costs (Panel B), which are broken down across the various 
fee categories. First, stamp duty imposed by the tax authorities has been at equal levels in both 
exchanges at any given time throughout the sample period (i.e. changes have occurred 
simultaneously across venues). Second, this equality also applies to broker commissions during 
the sample period, which are capped at the same fixed level of transaction value on both stock 
exchanges. Lastly, the commissions include other levies (supervision, transfer and transaction 
fees) collected by brokers on behalf of the financial authorities and the stock exchanges. These 
levies are either equal across exchanges (the supervision fee) or remained unchanged throughout 
the sample period (e.g. transfer fee and transaction fee). Thus, to summarize, trading costs are 
nearly fully harmonized across the two exchanges – and the few documented simultaneous 
changes (cf. stamp duty) and minor differences in levels (cf. transfer and transaction fees) are 
fully captured and controlled for (differenced out) in the empirical methodology (difference-in-
difference estimation), which is described in detail in the next section. 
 
3 Empirical analysis 
3.1 Data and sample specification 
The Level II data service became available in August 2006 and covered all stocks listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. As no transparency change occurred for Shenzhen listed stocks at this 
time, those stocks constitute a natural control group. Thus, in order to measure the effect of Level 
II we obtain weekly data for all firms listed on both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange between January 2004 and August 2009.
9
 The study focuses on securities listed 
on the A-market, which is open to trade by domestic and qualified foreign investors, making it 
both relatively liquid and representative of other global stock markets. Hence, the dataset includes 
                                                 
8
 Statistics on employment and GDP contribution is on par with the financial sector in Tokyo, the leading financial 
hub in Asia in terms traded equity value (with Hong Kong and Shanghai as runners up). The ratio of financial 
employees to city population is also comparable to the greater metropolitan area of New York, Newark and 
Bridgeport (Nielsson and Wojcik, 2012). 
9
 The Level II subscriber data is available to the authors up until August 2009. A weekly data frequency is chosen 
rather than daily, or intra-day, as any transparency effects may otherwise be confounded by short-term noise and 
volatility. 
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all firms ever listed in both exchanges during the sample period, which amounts to 844 firms in 
Shanghai and 750 firms in Shenzhen with readily available data. The key variables for these firms 
are summarized in Table 3. 
 
Subscriber data 
As noted in the introduction, the setting of the paper offers the possibility of not only 
measuring average effects of a transparency reform, but also to lay out the dynamics of such a 
change. To clarify this further, the paper studies two margins of transparency: (a) the extensive 
margin, i.e. new type of information being released (corresponding to the introduction of Level II) 
and (b) the intensive margin, i.e. given a specific type of information, how many investors are 
actually using it (corresponding to the number of Level II subscribers). Specifically, not only do 
we observe a discrete, one-time increase in the amount of released information but also a 
continuous change in the number of subscribers of that information.10 
Although the subscriber data is a novel way to capture the intensive margin of transparency, it 
should be acknowledged that it is inevitably not a perfect measure of market-wide transparency, 
but rather serves as a reasonable proxy. Specifically, the stake size of each individual subscriber 
cannot be accounted for, which implicitly results in equal weighting of each investor. Although 
this is admittedly simplistic and likely to add some noise to our measure of transparency, it may 
not be unreasonable for Chinese data, which predominantly consists of investors with comparable 
wealth levels (China Securities Registration, 2009) and has an active presence of domestic, 
individual investors (The Economist, 2009). But more importantly, this issue merely effects the 
interpretation of the results, not their merit. More precisely, although one additional subscriber 
cannot be interpreted as an economically meaningful increase in market-wide transparency, an 
addition of 100,000 subscribers is more likely to constitute a real and representative change. Thus, 
the subsequent analysis will avoid interpretation of marginal effects and instead focus on larger 
and more intuitive ‘step increases’ in the number of subscribers. Also, an argument can be made 
that more influential traders (e.g. institutional traders) are among the first group of subscribers, 
which may lead to relatively large liquidity reactions in the first months following the Level II 
introduction. Thus, with this caveat in mind, the subsequent empirical analysis separately studies 
the immediate impact of the transparency increase (section 3.3). 
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 It should be noted that the exact distribution of Level II subscribers is unfortunately a confidential variable with 
important business implications for the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Due to the competitive importance that this 
variable has to the exchange, its full details cannot be openly disclosed. However, the authors can assert that this 
variable offers rich variability, with the number of subscribers going from zero to well beyond 300,000 at the end of 
the sample period. Further statistics on this variable can be confidentially provided to referees of an academic journal. 
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Lastly, it is worth noting is that the number of software subscribers represents a significant 
fraction of the investor base – and thereby a meaningful part of the transparency domain. 
Specifically, using aggregated annual data on stock market participation, we estimate that 
approximately 30% of active investors are subscribing to the software at the end of our sample, 
who moreover (assuming that larger investors subscribe first) can be estimated to hold 
approximately 64% of the stock market value.
11
 Also, since it is impossible to continuously 
measure the fraction of investors subscribing (as the number of active investors is only reported 
annually), it is reassuring that the absolute weekly number of software subscribers will constitute 
a meaningful, large and economically significant area on the transparency domain.
12
  
 
Outcome variables 
The liquidity effects of more pre- and post-trade transparency are examined by quantifying 
changes in both turnover and spreads. These two outcome variables of interest capture different 
liquidity dimensions, namely the impact on i) the amount of trading activity and ii) the cost of 
trading. Both variables are calculated in a standard way, where turnover is defined as the ratio of 
the number of shares traded in a specific stock to the total number of shares outstanding in that 
stock. Likewise, quoted bid and ask prices are used to calculate spreads as the difference in ask 
and bid, divided by the midquote.
13
 
 
Control group and identification 
In order for Shenzhen firms to be a reliable control group it needs to be assumed that 
Shenzhen listed firms are inherently no different than Shanghai listed firms.
14
 This ensures that 
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 These figures are based on information from the China Securities Registration (2009), where the number of active 
investors corresponds to the number of open trade accounts with at least one trade taking place during the year and 
having positive stock holdings of at least $20,000 at year end (note that this cutoff implies that the $200 annual fee 
represents at most 1% of wealth, which seems a reasonable upper bound on the number of potential subscribers to the 
software). Also, these estimates are likely to be quite conservative since further restrictions on the number of active 
investors can easily be justified, such as on the frequency of trading (e.g. strictly more than one trade per year) or by 
taking into account that one investor may control several trade accounts (or make trading decision for several other 
investors). 
12
 Furthermore, the total number of investors has remained quite stable in the sample period (China Securities 
Registration, 2009), which further justifies using the absolute number of subscribers as our measure (as calculating 
the fraction roughly corresponds to dividing by a constant). 
13
 Another common and straightforward measure of trading activity is value of volume, which was also examined 
throughout the entire analysis. The results were in all cases the same as for turnover. Thus, since turnover and value 
of volume both capture trading activity and the all results hold for either measure, only turnover (which is not 
currency denominated) is included for brevity. Also, although many other (liquidity) measures may be of interest, we 
limit the analysis to these two major measures (trading activity and costs), in an effort to limit the 
multidimensionality – and thereby enhance the tractability – of the analysis. 
14
 Note that this assumption only needs to hold true for (unobservable) time-variant characteristics, since time-
constant characteristics is controlled for in the fixed effects regression methodology that is introduced in section 
Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.. 
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potential differences in liquidity do not merely reflect different characteristics of the listed stocks. 
To safeguard against such issues we define a working sample that is subject to two restrictions. 
First, in September 2000 the Chinese government announced a policy change where 
henceforth all new technology firms would be listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The aim 
was to create a NASDAQ-style exchange to complement the Shanghai (NYSE-style) exchange. 
However, before September 2000 no such policy existed and no systematic mechanism was in 
place that determined the listing location of firms. Thus, in order to ensure that stocks across the 
two exchanges are as compatible as possible, we restrict our sample to include only firms listed in 
China before September 2000. Thereby we alleviate the potential concern that (time variant) firm 
characteristics may be contaminating the estimation results. This further improves on numerous 
existing studies that use e.g. NYSE and NASDAQ firms as treatment and control groups, despite 
possible inherent differences in (time-variant) firm characteristics.
15
 
Second, before September 2000, firms that were located in either the city of Shanghai or 
Shenzhen may naturally be more likely to be listed at their local exchange (this is verified by 
statistical tests, which are omitted for brevity). Since the two cities may differ in terms of which 
kind of businesses they attract, this can potentially create a systematic difference in 
(unobservable, time-variant) firm characteristics across the two exchanges. To further ensure that 
such differences do not influence the estimation results, the working sample – consisting of firms 
listed on either exchange before September 2000 – is further restricted to firms that originate from 
outside the two cities. Summary statistics for this working sample are reported in Table 3 – along 
with the original, unrestricted sample. It can be observed that once the sample is restricted on 
listing date and location, the difference in mean values across the two exchanges becomes smaller 
for all variables. For example, once restricting on location and listing date, the average firm size – 
measured as either asset value or number of employees – converges across the two exchanges, 
which is consistent with more analogous firm characteristics in the treatment and the control 
group. Also worth noting, the existing literature typically finds that price movements are very 
similar across the two markets for various data frequencies (see e.g. Girardin and Liu, 2005). 
Finally, in order to safeguard completely that Shenzhen firms are a reliable control group, it 
would be advantageous to establish statistically that prior to the transparency change Shenzhen 
firms followed a similar trend in the outcome variables to Shanghai listed firms. If this is the case, 
any observed post-event change in trend can be attributed to the transparency policy change 
(given an adequate regression methodology and controls, to be detailed in section Erreur ! 
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 See e.g. Chung and Chuwonganant (2007), who attempt to address this issue by creating comparable stock samples 
across the two exchanges based on e.g. share price, trading volume, return volatility, etc. 
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Source du renvoi introuvable.). In order to verify this, each outcome variable is regressed on an 
exchange-specific, cubic time trend for the pre-event period (January 2004 – July 2006) and the 
statistical difference of these two non-linear trends is tested. Specifically, we estimate the 
following regression equation 
   ittiiiiit wfSHGtSHGtSHGty  
3
3
2
21  (1) 
for both liquidity measures, y, where SHG indicates a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
for Shanghai listed firms and zero for Shenzhen firms. The term fi indicates the fixed effects 
regression methodology and the implicit capture of all time-constant firm characteristics. In 
addition to this, weekly dummies (week fixed effects, wt) are included to pick up the average 
weekly change in the outcome variables across all firms on both exchanges. Since all variation in 
outcomes variables that is common across exchanges is thereby filtered out, only exchange 
specific variation will remain. Hence, the joint significance of coefficients γ1, γ2 and γ3 will test 
the equality of the two non-linear, exchange-specific trends. 
Table 4 reports the estimation results in two different panels. Panel A reports the results when 
all Shanghai and Shenzhen firms are included in the sample. As already noted, stock 
characteristics are likely to be inherently different across the two exchanges and therefore the 
joint significance of the three interaction terms is non-surprisingly rejected for both liquidity 
measures (see χ2-statistics and corresponding p-value in last row of Table 4). In other words, in 
Panel A the flexible time trend is significantly different across the two exchanges for both 
outcomes variables. Moreover, individual coefficients are even significantly different across 
exchanges in the case of spreads. In contrast, once restricting on firms that listed on either 
exchange before September 2000 and are located outside the two cities (Panel B), the pre-event 
time trends of the two firm groups are no longer statistically different. Also, the joint significance 
of the three time trend coefficients is rejected, as indicated by the χ2-statistics. The fact that time 
trends are statistically the same across the two exchanges for both outcome variables in the pre-
event period, verifies that Shenzhen listed firms are an appropriate control group for Shanghai 
listed firms, once restricting on firm location and listing date. 
3.2 Overall effect (extensive margin) 
Before applying a more technical regression methodology, it is useful to briefly present the 
raw data and gauge at long-term patterns. Figure 1 plots the two liquidity measures for the 
working sample over the full sample period. More precisely, the difference in liquidity measures 
across the two exchanges is plotted over time, thereby shedding light on whether the transparency 
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change was effective. Since the effective amount of transparency is likely to depend on the 
number of subscribers to the transparency enhancing software, the gradual long-run liquidity 
dynamics are likely vary with the different subscription intensity over time (as we study further in 
section 3.4). Figure 1 seems to confirm this variability, showing a gradually increasing level of 
trading activity (turnover) for Shanghai firms relative to Shenzhen firms in the post-Level II 
period. In contrast, bid-ask spreads seem to become relatively wider for Shanghai stocks in the 
post-level II period (although this trend is reversed at the end of the sample period). However, it is 
important to emphasize that no causation is yet being established. Furthermore, the long-term 
pattern can naturally differ from the short-term impact that follows immediately after the software 
is becomes accessible (cf. section 3.3). Now, however, we first turn to examining the examining 
overall and long-term average impact of the transparency increase. 
To estimate more accurately the overall relationship between increased trade transparency and 
liquidity, we regress the two liquidity measures on an event dummy that takes the value of one in 
the post-Level II period and zero otherwise. As this event dummy only takes the value of one for 
Shanghai firms in the post-Level II period, the dummy coefficient will quantify the average effect 
of releasing new type of information (namely the information embedded in the Level II software) 
on liquidity in ‘treated’ Shanghai listed firms, relative to the liquidity levels of the ‘untreated’ 
Shenzhen firms. Stated differently, the ‘difference-in-difference’ estimate resulting from the pre- 
vs. post-period comparison (first difference) across the Shanghai vs. Shenzhen exchanges (second 
difference) captures the liquidity impact of events occurring in post-period Shanghai only (the 
Level II impact), while all other non-varying or common market features are differenced out. For 
example, the methodology differences out non-varying trading costs (cf. commissions and levies) 
and common changes in costs (cf. stamp duty) as noted in section 2.3. The panel analysis is also 
restricted on the sample of firms that listed before September 2000 and are located outside 
Shanghai and Shenzhen (cf. section 3.1). Moreover, to further take into account any (unobserved) 
firm characteristics we employ a firm fixed effects regression methodology that captures all time-
constant firm characteristics that might otherwise contaminate the regression results. Thus, the 
regression model is 
   itittiSubscrit
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where the dummy variable, DSubscr>0, is equal to one for Shanghai firms in the post-event period 
(which corresponds to the period where there is a positive number of software subscribers) and 
zero otherwise. The term fi indicates firm fixed effects and wt denotes weekly dummies (week 
fixed effects) that pick up the average weekly change in the outcome variables across all firms on 
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both exchanges. Since all variation in outcome variables that is common across exchanges is 
thereby filtered out, the coefficient of interest, β, will only measure variation beyond the average 
variation in outcome variables in each week. For example, if a countrywide liquidity shock occurs 
in, say, week 1 of 2008, then the average impact thereof is caught by the corresponding weekly 
dummy and therefore β only reports liquidity variation beyond this average (i.e. the impact 
unassociated with the common shock). Hence the week fixed effect controls for any overall, 
unrelated events to the fullest extent possible. Furthermore, any change in liquidity (beyond the 
average variation in each week) is measured relatively to the Shenzhen control group that does not 
offer subscription to the transparency enhancing software. Thus the only assumption needed – in 
order to attribute changes in liquidity to the transparency change – is that prior to the new 
transparency policy Shenzhen firms followed a similar trend in the outcome variables as Shanghai 
listed firms, which is already established in section 3.1 for the working sample. 
The last term, Zit, represents any other time-variant control variables that in general capture 
exchange (or stock) specific events or trends. More specifically, these may include endogenous 
market factors (e.g. bid-ask spreads may help to determine turnover, and vice versa) or other 
variables that may contribute to the liquidity variation (say, volatility). We return to such issues in 
section 3.5, where a careful sensitivity analysis is carried out to verify the robustness of all 
reported results. In addition, this last term represents an extra safeguard included in all subsequent 
analysis, which involves carefully controlling for another policy change that introduced a 
transparency enhancing software in 2007. The effect of this change is filtered out by a binary 
dummy variable since there is no subscriber data available for this software. This data limitation 
implies that this software introduction provides a far less attractive setting than the Level II 
transparency change and therefore the subsequent presentation does not focus on this event.
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Instead, this discussion is left to the robustness section 3.5, which confirms all key results. 
The estimation results from the model specification in equation (2) are reported in Table 5. 
The table shows the overall average change in liquidity associated with the one-time increase in 
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 To clarify briefly why this transparency change is not of interest, the lack of subscriber data for this software 
(named TopView) means that it is implausible to fully measure and interpret the effect of this change in a similar 
manner to the Level II analysis – thus it is excluded. Moreover, the software was relatively expensive ($3,000 a year) 
and only provided static end-of-day snapshots (not dynamic real-time data) that were easily obtainable at on-line 
piracy websites at the end of each trading day. The illegal snapshots distributed daily among non-subscribers further 
makes it implausible to measure the effective, gradual increase in transparency due to this event. In other words, even 
if any subscriber data were available, it would not be reliable since illegal copies were distributed daily among non-
subscribers. All this implies that it is unfortunately impossible to capture the effective, gradual increase in 
transparency from this event in a credible way – in contrast to the favorable setting that the Level II software 
provides. Due to these extensive drawbacks we choose to filter out any potential effect this policy change may have 
had and instead focus our analysis entirely on the transparency change we can more reliably measure and interpret in 
our dataset. 
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transparency (pre- vs. post Level II introduction). First, turnover is positively and significantly 
affected by the transparency change. Specifically, column (1) indicates that the one-time increase 
in transparency (going from no software users to some positive number of users) causes an 
average increase in daily turnover of 0.121 percentage points per stock. This is a considerable 
increase compared to the average daily turnover level of 1.42 percentage points for Shanghai 
listed stocks (cf. summary statistics in Table 3), i.e. it corresponds to an approximately 8.5% 
increase in turnover. In monetary terms, this translates into a sizeable increase in daily volume of 
5 million Yuan per firm – or approximately 800 thousand U.S. dollars. This average firm increase 
is therefore quite large, in particular when keeping in mind that this increase is directly associated 
with a market-wide (not firm specific event) increase in transparency. Second, the transparency 
change is associated with a statistically significant increase in bid-ask spreads (column 2), 
implying that trading costs may have increased with more trade transparency. More specifically, 
spreads have widened by 0.017 percentage points, which represents a 6.5% increase compared to 
the average spread for Shanghai stocks (cf. summary statistics in Table 3). In other words, even 
though trading activity rises, there are higher costs associated with trading in the Shanghai stock 
market. 
The widening of bid-ask spreads deserves clarification. Although generally it may not be 
unreasonable to expect more trading volume to be associated with narrower bid-ask spreads, this 
result is not predicted by papers specifically studying the effects of withdrawing broker 
anonymity on bid-ask spreads.  For example, Desgranges and Foucault (2005) present a 
theoretical model where allowing dealers to know the identity of traders can widen spreads. They 
argue that the existence of dealer-client relationships allows dealers to cream-skim for uninformed 
order-flow, i.e. primarily trade with those (uninformed) clients who tend to consistently provide 
the dealer with positive trading profits. This, on the other hand, increases the risk of informed 
trading for dealers without such relationships, which respond by raising their profit margin (widen 
bid-ask spreads) to counteract the higher probability of more informed (and thus less profitable) 
trades. These theoretical predictions are verified by empirical studies that find that average bid-
ask spreads are wider in a less anonymous market structure (Simaan, Weaver and Whitcomb, 
2003; Comerton-Forde, Frino and Mollica, 2005; Foucault, Moinas and Theissen, 2007). As noted 
in section 2.2, one of the major pre-trade transparency changes brought about by the Level II 
software was to lower the degree of anonymity by enabling users to concentrate their trades with 
counterparties of certain characteristics (such as small/uninformed order flow). Thus, as this 
allows some dealers to cream-skim for uninformed order-flow, it simultaneously leaves other 
dealers (who lack this capacity) at a higher average risk of entering informed and less profitable 
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trades – making them seek protection in wider profit margins (wider spreads). Thus, the positive 
relationship between transparency and spread reported in Table 5 supports these findings of the 
literature.
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To summarize, Table 5 concludes that the market has benefitted from the increase in trade 
transparency in terms of more trading activity, while the downside is wider bid-ask spreads. This 
is informative in itself and typically a transparency event study will end here, i.e. by revealing the 
average treatment effect. Here, however, we additionally observe the continuous changes in the 
number of subscribers after the date at which the transparency enhancing software is introduced, 
further allowing us to study the immediate effect resulting from early subscribers (section 3.3) and 
the overall liquidity dynamics as more market players gradually subscribe (section 3.4). 
3.3 Immediate impact (early subscribers) 
Section 3.2 established the overall market effect on liquidity (increased turnover and 
widening spreads) over the full sample period. In addition to this, it is of specific interest to 
examine the impact the transparency change has had on different categories of traders, in 
particular on major institutional traders that are arguably the ones most affected by such a change. 
Major traders do not only have the most at stake, but they are presumably also the most 
responsive to any alteration in market conditions and trading operations, which makes them more 
likely to immediately exploit the increased transparency benefits of the Level II software. We do 
not directly observe the identity of traders, but since major traders are relatively more invested 
and active in the marketplace, it is reasonable to presume that institutional traders are among the 
first group of subscribers. Intuitively, this may lead to large liquidity reactions in the first few 
months of the Level II operation. Thus, we next empirically evaluate the immediate liquidity 
impact around the date of the software introduction. 
To first examine this in a simple univariate setting, Panel A of Table 6 reports the results of an 
event-study that compares liquidity before and after the Level II introduction for both exchanges 
using standard t-tests. The analysis is restricted to the immediate six months before and after the 
Level II introduction. The results reveal that the liquidity measures have changed significantly on 
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 Similarly, Madhavan, Porter and Weaver (2005) theoretically describe how increased transparency allows informed 
traders to tap the liquidity offered by the limit order book more efficiently, which increases informed traders’ 
expected profits. This may make uninformed traders less willing to provide liquidity, represented by wider bid-ask 
spreads. Interestingly, Madhavan, Porter and Weaver (2005) also add an empirical analysis that establishes widening 
bid-ask spreads from a policy change increasing pre-trade transparency, which is consistent with their argument – as 
well as our results. Finally, on top of this, the widening of bid-ask spreads is also consistent with faster transactions 
data (cf. change no. 4 in Table 1). This is e.g. supported by Hendershott and Moulton (2011) who show that reducing 
execution time by 10 seconds increases adverse selection and thereby results in wider bid-ask spreads 
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both exchanges, which reemphasizes one of the contributions of this paper, i.e. having a reliable 
control group and thereby avoiding to mistakenly associating countrywide changes in outcome 
variables to a market-specific transparency change. Namely, the raw double differencing shows 
significant disparities across the two markets, suggesting that the Shanghai liquidity change 
following Level II cannot be attributed entirely to countrywide changes. More specifically, 
comparing the pre- vs. post period, turnover has increased by 0.12 percentage points more for 
Shanghai vs. Shenzhen firms. This is a large liquidity impact as the overall difference in turnover 
between all Shanghai vs. Shenzhen firms is only 0.06 percentage points across the whole sample 
(and 0.01 percentage points for the working sample – see summary statistics in Table 3). 
Moreover, this change is fully on par with the overall increase in turnover reported in Table 5 and 
discussed in section 3.2 above. Hence, this indicates that the bulk of the Level II effect is 
attributable to the impact it has on early subscribers. In other words, the magnitude aligns with 
major traders being relatively more affected and responding more significantly to the transparency 
change compared to other market players. Additionally, Table 6 further reports that bid-ask 
spreads have narrowed less for Shanghai vs. Shenzhen firms over the year surrounding the Level 
II introduction. The relative change in spreads is sizeable (0.02 percentage points) since it reaches 
the same order of magnitude as the overall difference in spreads across markets over the whole 
sample period (see Table 3) – and again it corresponds fully with the overall change reported in 
Table 5. Thus, this relative widening of bid-ask spreads on Shanghai implies a considerable 
negative impact on trading costs immediately following the introduction of the transparency 
enhancing software. 
These raw univariate results are confirmed in Panel B, which shows the results of a more 
elaborate multivariate analysis following the previously described model in section 3.2 and 
corresponding regression equation (2). Again focusing on the immediate impact surrounding the 
six months before and after the Level II transparency change shows a strong and statistical 
significant relationship between liquidity and increased transparency. This more careful analysis 
leads to slightly lower magnitudes compared to Panel A, but the results still indicate that the 
immediate impact of the first subscribers (0.105 and 0.014) accounts for the vast majority of the 
overall effect reported in Table 5 (0.121 and 0.017). The impact on turnover translates into an 
increase in daily volume of 4.3 million Yuan ($690,000) per firm listed on the Shanghai stock 
exchange. This average firm increase is therefore of an economic magnitude that is significant for 
even the largest of traders. Similarly, the widening of bid-ask spreads represents a 5.4% increase 
compared to the average spread for Shanghai stocks (cf. summary statistics in Table 3). This 
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represents a considerable increase in trading costs, in particular for those traders who are the most 
active market participants. 
Overall, the magnitude of the immediate liquidity impact follows the established predictions. 
For example, the widening of bid-ask spreads conforms to earlier results and existing theories of 
the impact of less broker anonymity (cf. discussion in section 3.2).  But furthermore, when 
focusing solely on major (informed) traders, there may be additional mechanisms at work that 
widen spreads, resulting in the quantitatively large magnitudes observed in Table 6. Specifically, 
Kryzanowski and Lazrak (2009) note that if the intensified trading (higher turnover) is due to 
increased informed trading then liquidity may be adversely affected (wider spreads). To elaborate, 
Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) model fragmented markets where there is a preference of informed 
traders to trade in the thickest market to better hide their trades. Thus, more trading activity – such 
as increased turnover in our setting – may simply hide more informed trading (Barclay and 
Warner, 1993; Chakravarty, 2001) and this can lead market makers to react by increasing their 
profit margin – i.e. widening spreads – to counteract higher probability of more informed (and 
thus less profitable) trades. This scenario is explicitly observed within the setting of this paper. 
More specifically, by the very nature of the event being studied – i.e. the introduction of an 
information enhancing software – the market participants become more informed overall about 
market statistics. Thus, as the pool of knowledgeable traders is larger, dealers become more likely 
to trade with such investors. The increased risk of trading with such counterparties can lead 
dealers to widen their bid-ask spreads.
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Arguably, this described effect is likely to be the strongest in the initial stages following the 
introduction of Level II.  Namely, since big institutional traders – who are relatively more active 
in the market – are likely to be among the first subscribers to the transparency enhancing 
software, the probability of trading with a more informed partner (a Level II subscriber) increases 
the most initially. Thus the immediate widening of bid-ask spreads aligns with market makers 
adjusting their behavior (widening bid-ask spreads) in reaction to a higher risk of trading with 
more informed counterparties. This immediate impact contrasts later stages when less active 
market participants (such as households) represent a larger share of additional subscribers. Then 
the probability of market makers trading with an informed counterparty does not rise to the same 
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 It is worth noting the in the outlined literature traders are generally thought of as being informed about 
fundamentals, whereas in our setting traders obtain information on trade statistics. However, if trading behavior 
reflects (at least partly) information on fundamentals, then becoming more knowledgeable on trade statistics can 
result in a similar response by dealers. We thank Yakov Amihud for raising our awareness of this issue. 
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extent and thereby this effect gradually recedes (which is consistent with the dynamics reported in 
section 3.4 below, which shows more moderate changes in bid-ask spreads at later stages).
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Other measures of trading behavior 
The immediate increase in turnover and widening of spreads is likely to emerge from the 
impact the transparency change has on major institutional traders. To verify this, we deepen the 
analysis to consider other market variables that are likely to change from altered trading behavior 
of major traders. Most notably, major traders that carry relatively large volumes on a day-to-day 
basis are likely to attempt to lower their price impact by hiding their trading strategy (e.g. 
Comerton-Forde et al., 2011). A common strategy for informed traders to conceal their actions is 
to break up their large trades into several smaller pieces (Barclay and Warner, 1993; Chakravarty, 
2001). However, this is likely to be less advantageous in markets so transparent that they offer 
limited space to hide, i.e. where such trading strategies can be identified and documented by other 
market participants. More specifically, as multiple trades are costly (in particular with wider 
spreads and costly small trades, cf. Chakravarty, 2001), major traders realize less value from 
breaking up their trades if such tactics are observable anyhow by other market players. This is 
exactly the predicted effect in the Shanghai setting where the high level of transparency comes 
from the two key changes that directly work to illuminate investors’ trading strategies. 
Specifically, as previously described in section 2.2, by revealing trader characteristics (trader size) 
and all individual transactions, any subscriber of the Level II software should in principle be able 
to identify the trading patterns of any major trader – for example, whether anyone is building up 
(or down) positions in specific stocks. In such a highly transparent market where costly attempts 
to hide one’s trades are not likely to be successful, traders are incentivized to enter relatively 
fewer transactions with higher average volumes per trade. 
Hence, to examine whether the trading behavior of major traders is truly affected by the Level 
II transparency change, we compile data on the number of trades and average trade size for every 
stock in our working sample covering the six months before and after the introduction of Level 
II.
20
 Panel C in Table 6 reports the results from the benchmark regression equation (2) that 
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 On top of this, the effect could further amplify when relatively few people have access to the detailed transparency 
data, as this in principle gives rise to an adverse selection scenario that leads uninformed market participants to exit 
the market (cf. Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991). Thus, if small traders subtract from the market following Level II and 
thus it predominantly consists of major traders, then that will raise the probability of trading with an informed 
counter-party – which again may widen bid-ask spreads further. 
20
 This data is obtained from a private data vendor named SINA (http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/), which is the 
only source known to us to provide this data for the Chinese market. The service offers daily documents for each 
listed stock, so obtaining this data involves downloading, processing and merging over 200,000 separate data files 
before merging it to an aggregate weekly level. 
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estimates the Level II impact on Shanghai listed firms relative to the Shenzhen control group. The 
estimates support the above predictions. There are on average 59 fewer trades per day for each 
Shanghai stock in the working sample, which translates into a 10.5% decrease (the pre-Level II 
daily average is 558 trades per stock). Consistently, the average size of each individual trade 
increases by 9,633 Yuan ($1,570) for every stock, which corresponds to a rise of 16.7% (the pre-
Level II trade size is 57,800 Yuan per stock). Thus, the immediate impact on trading behavior is 
both statistically and economically significant. 
Lastly, to verify the magnitudes of these percentage estimates – and to mitigate the effect of 
potential large numerical values/outliers – the last two columns in Panel C report estimates of the 
same analysis carried out in logs. The results are quite robust, showing a 5.8% decline in the 
average daily number of trades per stock and a 15% increase in the average volume per trade. 
Thus, to conclude, these auxiliary results support that the Level II transparency change has a 
considerable impact on major traders, leading them to alter their trading behavior. Moreover, 
these changes may not only be limited to trade size and frequency, but may further spill over to 
other market outcomes. For example, it can be argued that a higher price impact of larger trades 
can potentially work to raise market volatility (we return to volatility analysis in section 3.5, 
verifying increased volatility). But keeping the focus on the liquidity impact of more trade 
transparency, we conclude that there is a sharp immediate reaction in both liquidity and trading 
behavior as traders start subscribing to the transparency enhancing software. This conforms with 
the idea that the most active and invested market participants (i.e. major institutional investors) 
are among the first subscribers, and that they are both strongly affected and significantly 
responsive to the transparency change. 
3.4 Gradual increase in transparency access (intensive margin) 
Although the results in section 3.3 show that the bulk of the overall liquidity impact of 
increased transparency is immediate, it still leaves room for evaluating the subsequent liquidity 
dynamics resulting from additional subscribers. Notably, even though later subscribers are 
associated with a relatively incremental cumulative effect, the associated liquidity dynamics of 
their participation can nonetheless shed light on the overall functional form between liquidity and 
the intensive margin of transparency. In other words, studying the evolution of liquidity outcomes 
over the entire sample period can reveal how the overall impact (studied in section 3.2) gradually 
comes into effect, i.e. how the incremental benefits of more transparency differ depending on how 
many people have access to the transparency enhancing information at any point in time. For 
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example, although the results above may suggest that liquidity outcomes of increased 
transparency follow the law of diminishing returns on the intensive margin – implying a concave 
function between pre-existing levels of transparency and the marginal liquidity benefits thereof 
(cf. Eom, Ok and Park, 2007) – such a relationship is not the only possible pattern. Instead, one 
could e.g. imagine that increased trade transparency may initially lead to worse market outcomes 
(e.g. wider spreads) when relatively few people have access to the detailed transparency data, but 
that this trend is later reversed (i.e. temporary non-monotonicity in liquidity outcomes). To 
elaborate, this could occur in the presence of adverse selection where relatively few, early 
subscribers might use the detailed trading information for their own interests at the expense of the 
market as a whole. For example, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) note that when information is 
asymmetrically allocated less informed traders may choose not to participate in the market. In our 
setting, any such adverse selection drawbacks could gradually recede as more traders would 
subscribe to the transparency-enhancing data package, implying a non-monotonic relationship 
between liquidity and the intensive margin of transparency.
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To investigate such dynamics we estimate changes in liquidity as the number of Level II 
subscribers gradually increases. Specifically, the two liquidity measures are regressed on a 
function of the number of Level II subscribers, in addition to the same set of controls as used 
previously (cf. equation 2). Specifically, we estimate 
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where g(·) can in principle be any function of the number of Level II subscribers and other 
variables are defined as before. In order to put minimal constraints on the function g(·), it is 
assumed to follow a flexible 5
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 order polynomial of the form 
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This semi-parametric framework allows us to estimate the coefficients β1-β5 and then use those 
estimates to plot the non-linear relationship between the liquidity measures, yit, and the number of 
subscribers. Figure 2 displays the results. Due to the week fixed effects structure in equation (3), 
the figure displays the variation in liquidity for Shanghai firms beyond the average variation in 
liquidity across all firms (listed on either Shanghai or Shenzhen exchange). Values are initially 
bound at zero as the estimated value of liquidity is zero when no one subscribes to the 
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 Moreover, as another example, it is frequently argued that even though more transparency is likely to be beneficial 
on average (e.g. increased turnover), it can nonetheless be detrimental to liquidity if it becomes too excessive. For 
example, Cespa and Foucault (2009) argue that although a higher level of transparency promotes informational 
efficiency, full transparency is not socially optimal. Relating this to our setting it might be possible that liquidity 
deteriorates as the transparency level surmounts above a specific threshold. 
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transparency enhancing software (cf. equations 3 and 4). Turnover then depicts an upward trend 
as more and more traders subscribe to the software. Thus, Figure 2 displays how the previously 
established result – of increased trading activity with more transparency – gradually comes into 
effect. The cumulative change adds up to around 0.18 percentage points, which can be compared 
to the average 0.12 percentage point increase established in Table 5 (this average could intuitively 
be graphically represented as a horizontal line extending through the entire range of software 
subscribers in Figure 2). Also consistent with previous results, the overall effect of more 
transparency is to widen spreads. However, the dynamics are non-monotonic as the pattern of 
widening bid-ask spreads only holds initially. As more traders subscribe the effect gradually 
wears out and ultimately bid-ask spreads start to narrow, although they do not reach their pre-
event levels (leaving the overall effect positive). Also notably, the figures resemble the overall 
post-Level II pattern observed when plotting the raw data in Figure 1 (this similarity reflects the 
near-randomization of the treatment vs. control group, since otherwise a systematically different 
control group would imply significantly different firm fixed effects across the two firm groups, 
resulting in another pattern in Figure 2). 
Even though the model described in equations (3) and (4) is informative, it is unfortunately 
not very tractable for numerical analysis. Thus, in order to quantify numerically the general trends 
observed in Figure 2, the pattern is summarized by breaking the polynomial into a three-step 
function. More specifically, although the flexible specification in equation (4) allows for an 
informative graphical representation, it has the disadvantage that it is difficult to numerically filter 
out the general trend in the relationship between transparency and liquidity. Furthermore, a 
parsimonious step function also better allows for numerically testing the significance of the 
liquidity changes at different levels of transparency (rather than doing this numerically for every 
point of the polynomial). Thus, in order to better quantify the relationship, the average levels of 
liquidity for different intervals of transparency (rather than at every single point) are established 
by simplifying equations (3) and (4) into a three step function of the following form 
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where the three dummy variables equal one if the number of subscribers is in the corresponding 
interval, and zero otherwise. The intervals are chosen such that the entire range of subscribers is 
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divided into three equal parts.
22
 This three-step model intuitively summarizes the non-linear 
relationship established in Figure 2 by filtering out the average level of transparency for three 
different intervals of software subscribers. The graphical representation of this model is added to 
Figure 2, which highlights the general trend in the relationship between liquidity and 
transparency. The corresponding coefficient estimates and statistical tests are reported in Table 7. 
Table 7 numerically reveals that the transparency impact on liquidity varies with the level of 
information usage. For turnover, the incremental liquidity effect is initially relatively modest 
(0.021) but as the number of subscribers increases the cumulative turnover effect becomes 
statistically positive and gradually reaches an increase of 0.18 percentage points (the resulting 
average increase in turnover over the whole subscriber range is 0.12 percentage points, as 
previously reported in Table 5). This shows that the positive effect from more transparency (cf. 
Table 5) comes gradually into effect and accumulates as more traders enjoy access to the 
additional pre- and post-trade information. 
The difference between the liquidity effects at various ranges of transparency is statistically 
verified at the bottom of Table 7. More precisely, the results show that the turnover effect of 
increased transparency is statistically greater (by 0.159 percentage points) with relatively many 
software subscribers, compared to the initial stage of relatively few users. In other words, this 
statistically verifies that the impact on liquidity statistically differs across the range of subscribers. 
Hence, this highlights the relevance of being able to identify gradual transparency impacts, 
relative to one-time changes in transparency that other studies have naturally been confined to. 
More specifically, the possibility to capture liquidity effects across a larger spectrum is valuable 
since the effect may very well differ across the various stages of the software usage – as is shown 
to be the case in Table 7. 
Compared to turnover, bid-ask spreads are more responsive to the increase in transparency, 
i.e. the three-step function in Figure 2 – and corresponding estimates in Table 7 – reveal an initial 
and relatively large increase in spreads that becomes relatively stable thereafter. In other words, 
the average impact on bid-ask spreads (reported to be 0.017 in Table 5) is reached at the initial 
stage of relatively few subscribers (increase of 0.019 in Table 7). With more subscribers to the 
transparency enhancing software the bid-ask spreads remain stable around this level (up to 0.022 
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 The highest number of subscribers in the dataset is just above 300,000 so natural cutoff points seem to be at 
100,000 and 200,000 subscribers. The cutoffs remain virtually unchanged if they are determined such that the number 
of observations is equal in each of three intervals. Further, in principle it is of course possible to split the sample into 
a higher number of intervals, but here the analysis is restricted to three separate steps of transparency levels (number 
of subscribers) to better summarize the overall trend in the relationship between liquidity and transparency. More 
specifically, to do this in a quantitatively meaningful manner, it is necessary to work with a parsimonious model 
where the numeric interpretation of estimated coefficients is both manageable and tractable. 
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and then down to 0.016), where the difference is not statistically different across the three 
subscriber levels. Overall, this implies that initially more transparency can be harmful to bid-ask 
spreads, but the detrimental effect wears out once a critical mass has access to the transparency 
enhancing software (but does not fully reverse). Also, as with turnover, the average effect (0.017 
from Table 5) differs considerably from the impact the transparency enhancing software has at 
different stages of transparency (initial change is 0.019, then 0.004 increase at second step, 
followed by a decrease of 0.007 – see Table 7). This again highlights how the ‘treatment effect’ 
differs across the intensive margin of transparency. 
To summarize this section, it is apparent that the dynamic relationship between trade 
transparency and liquidity is non-monotonic and therefore it cannot be bluntly stated that 
increasing transparency on the intensive margin will outright increase (or decrease) the level of 
liquidity. More specifically, although a transparency change on average raises turnover and 
widens spreads (as established in section 3.2), this section has established that the dynamic 
incremental effect is likely to depend on the degree of transparency already in the system. This 
non-monotonic relationship – which is further tested and verified in the subsequent robustness 
section – is a noteworthy result for several reasons. Specifically, this result implies that on the 
intensive margin it cannot be assumed that the average treatment effect will necessarily apply 
across a wide spectrum of transparency levels. To create an intuitive analogy, it cannot be 
assumed that a transparency-increasing regime introduced across all EU countries will necessarily 
improve market outcomes for each member state – such a transparency change should rather be 
separately evaluated depending on the pre-existing level of transparency within each country. 
Furthermore, the variation in results across pre-existing transparency levels can help to explain 
the counter-acting conclusions of the existing, empirical literature. More precisely, each empirical 
study is bound to evaluate the effect of a transparency change relative to the pre-existing market 
conditions in each setting. Thus, results may differ since the transparency level already in place 
differs across each market being studied. 
3.5 Robustness and further results 
This section introduces several changes in methodology that underline the robustness of the 
results established in previous sections. In doing so, the motivation for employing previously 
presented models is better established and further justified. In addition to such a sensitivity 
analysis, this section adds a brief analysis of marginal (not level) effects of increased transparency 
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and concludes by evaluating the Level II transparency change in Shanghai relative to another 
(smaller) control sample, namely Shanghai stocks cross-listed in Hong Kong. 
 
Different functional form: Linear relationship 
An argument can be made that perhaps the most natural place to start the analysis is to model 
the relationship between transparency and liquidity as a linear one. More specifically, the simplest 
modeling choice is likely to be 
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where all variables are defined as before. Despite being statistically tractable and straightforward, 
this model has the immediate disadvantage that it provides much less flexibility and offers less 
economic content than e.g. the 5
th
 order relationship expressed in equation (4). However, for 
completeness, this (1
st
 order) specification is examined in Table 8, where the sample remains 
Shanghai and Shenzhen listed firms listed on either exchange before September 2000 and 
originating from outside the two cities. The results are in line with previously established 
conclusions – specifically, an increase in Level-II software subscribers is associated with higher 
turnover and wider bid-ask spreads. Also, although the change in functional form implies that the 
magnitudes of estimated coefficients are not directly comparable to former specifications, the 
results are remarkably similar. To illustrate this, the number of subscribers is rescaled into 
hundreds of thousands, which implies that for 100,000 additional subscribers, turnover increases 
by 0.073 percentage points. Thus, using the midpoint of subscribers (150,000) provides an 
average increase in turnover of 0.073∙1.5 = 0.11 percentage points, which is on par with the 
average effect reported in Table 5 (0.121). Similarly, the average effect on bid-ask spreads can be 
calculated to be 0.008 percentage points, which is not far off from the estimated value of 0.017 in 
Table 5. 
 
Different functional form: Log-log specification 
Since there is no apparent reason to presume that the relationship between transparency and 
liquidity is linear, a relatively simple log-log specification can be applied in order to allow for 
non-linear effects and mitigate the influence of potential outliers. Moreover, the argument that 
major traders subscribe earlier than other market participants implies that the marginal effect of 
each additional subscriber may decreases as the size of the marginal subscriber gradually becomes 
smaller. Statistically, this possible scenario is captured with a logarithm form that assumes 
decreasing marginal effects. Thus, the model now becomes 
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quantifying the average liquidity effect (measured by β) that can be associated with the 
introduction of the Level II software. The log-log specification implies that the estimated 
regression coefficients have a direct economic interpretation in terms of elasticity – namely, a 1% 
increase in the number of software subscribers is associated with a 0.012% (0.001%) increase in 
turnover (bid-ask spreads). Thus, the qualitative results reassuringly remain unchanged from 
previous specifications, with increasing turnover and widening bid-ask spreads.
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Marginal effects within each subscriber interval 
The main results on the intensive margin of transparency also deserve further scrutiny. 
Namely, the three-step equation (5) – with corresponding estimates reported in Table 7 – can 
easily be generalized to allow for more flexibility within each interval. As an example of that, the 
three-step model can be generalized to a three-slope model, where the marginal transparency 
effect on liquidity is allowed to differ within each of the three subscriber intervals (no longer 
assumed to be constant). Graphically, this implies that the three horizontal lines in Figure 2 are 
allowed to have non-zero slopes within each interval. Thus, the resulting function will be closer to 
the overall pattern of the 5
th
 order polynomial, but a parsimonious three-slope function will still 
maintain the ability to numerically quantify general trends and test their differences (which is 
practically infeasible for the polynomial, as discussed in section 3.4). In other words, it is possible 
to test whether the three slopes are different across intervals, implying different marginal effects 
of increased transparency within each stage of Level II subscription (i.e. non-monotonicity). More 
precisely, the following three-slope model is estimated 
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where the relationship between transparency and liquidity is allowed to vary linearly within each 
subscriber interval (the first three rows represent three linear equations). This model can also be 
                                                 
23
 Also, although the economic magnitude may at first seem humble, it is important to keep in mind the underlying 
range of the explanatory variable (0 - 300,000 number of users). This implies that a 1% increase is initially a very 
moderate magnitude, which then steadily increases over time as the number of users rises. Therefore, as the log-log 
specification is silent on how many additional software subscribers a 1% increase represents, the estimated 
magnitudes naturally cannot be directly related to previous results. The log-log specification can at most relate to log-
measures, i.e. the overall liquidity increase can be calculated to be [ln(300,000)-ln(1)]∙0.012 = 15% in log-turnover 
and, similarly, 1.3% for log-spreads. 
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thought of as a direct three-step extension of the linear model presented in equation (6). The 
estimates are reported in columns 5-6 in Table 8, where the coefficients of interest are naturally 
not comparable to earlier results as they are reporting marginal effects (slopes) at each interval, 
rather than levels (steps). As expected, the slope coefficients convey a similar pattern as depicted 
by the 5
th
 order polynomial in Figure 2 (thus graphics are excluded for brevity). For example, the 
marginal effect of increased transparency leads bid-ask spreads to initially widen (0.015), then 
spreads remain around the same level (non-significant -0.002), before again narrowing (-0.017). A 
test of whether all three slopes are equal is strongly rejected (not reported), which reinforces the 
previously established result that the liquidity impact depends on the degree of transparency 
already in place – i.e. there is a non-monotonic relationship between transparency and liquidity. 
Furthermore, this non-monotonicity now becomes marginally present for turnover as well, where 
turnover initially decreases (-0.156) before increasing again (0.210). The equality of all three 
slopes is accordingly rejected for turnover as well (not reported). 
 
Exclusion of the 2007-08 period  
The Chinese stock market was very turbulent in the last decade. After a stock market slump in 
2001-2005, the market rebounded in 2006. This contributed to an existing frenzy of stock market 
speculation (Ma, 1996; Girarding and Liu, 2003), which fueled immense turnover and volatility in 
2007. The stock price rally in China went far beyond the experiences of other world markets, as 
demonstrated in Figure 3 where historically high fluctuations in the S&P500 index seem 
miniscule in comparison to the Chinese market. As in other world markets, stock prices in China 
reached historic highs in 2007 before plummeting in 2008. 
The unusual boom-bust era of 2007-08 may potentially affect the estimated liquidity impact of 
Level II, although notably Figure 3 reveals very similar patterns for the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock markets. Hence, because previously established results measure the liquidity impact on 
Shanghai listed firms relative to their Shenzhen counterparts, this period is not likely to drive the 
differential results across the two markets. But to fully verify this we also explicitly exclude the 
2007-08 calendar years from the analysis. The results are reported in columns 7-8 of Table 8, 
which reruns the three-step regression model of equation (5). As the 2007-08 period roughly 
coincides with the period in which Level II had 100,000–200,000 subscribers, the coefficient 
estimate at this interval is naturally dropped. The results show that excluding the boom-bust 
period has no effect at all on the remaining estimates. More precisely, the initial impact of Level 
II (going from 0 to 100,000 subscribers) is unchanged for both liquidity measures and the 
cumulative change (over 200,000 subscribers) is also the same (cf. Table 7). Also, repeating the 
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analysis of the overall impact of Level II (i.e. the extensive margin reported in Table 5) similarly 
produces unchanged results (not reported). Thus, in conclusion, a strict exclusion of this period 
reconfirms that previous results can be fully contributed to the transparency changes of the Level 
II software. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the robustness of excluding the 2007-08 period further rules out 
the impact of other market changes in that period. For example, as noted in section Erreur ! 
Source du renvoi introuvable. – and detailed in footnote 1616 – the analysis takes extra care to 
control for the introduction of another transparency enhancing software (named TopView) in 
January 2007. Specifically, distributed piracy versions of the software content and the non-
availability of subscriber data prevents a meticulous analysis (as opposed to the Level II 
transparency change). Thus, any potential effect of this change is filtered out by a binary dummy 
throughout the paper. But moreover, as the controversy around the TopView software led it to be 
cancelled in January of 2009, the period in which the software was in place coincides exactly with 
the 2007-08 crisis period. Thus, the results in Table 8 (columns 7-8) also reconfirm the non-
significance of this change on the estimated Level II impact. 
 
Market factors: Liquidity and volatility 
So far the analysis has set aside potential issues of endogeneity. More precisely, the variation 
in liquidity measures may be partly explained by various market variables (such as volatility), 
which in return are determined by liquidity. Madhavan, Porter and Weaver (2005) give a concrete 
example of this by pointing out that observed changes in spreads may not be solely due to changes 
in transparency, but may also be a function of e.g. turnover and return volatility. This implies that 
if these factors are not controlled for the results could be biased. Despite this fact, Eom, Ok and 
Park (2007) note that many studies have not bothered to control for such factors or done so using 
inapplicable procedures. Hence, here we follow the methodology of Madhavan, Porter and 
Weaver (2005) and Eom, Ok and Park (2007) by controlling for both liquidity and volatility in 
our regression equations. The key results are reported in columns 9-10 in Table 8, in which the 
three-step equation (5) is estimated with the added endogenous controls. As shown, spreads are a 
significant determinant of turnover, and vice versa. As expected, return volatility also affects both 
liquidity measures. However, all coefficient estimates of the Level II effect are virtually 
unchanged, implying that our previous inferences do not result from endogenous changes in 
liquidity or volatility. In other words, even after controlling for other factors that may affect 
liquidity in this period, the results remain unchanged and thereby confirm our uncontrolled 
finding that liquidity is affected by the transparency change. 
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Lastly, although the primary focus of this study is to measure the liquidity impact of Level II, 
it is of additional interest to examine the accompanied volatility impact thereof. Thus, instead of 
only employing volatility as a control variable, Table 8 also reports key regressions equations 
with volatility as the outcome variable. In short, the results show overall increased volatility in the 
post-Level II period (column 11), where the immediate impact is particularly large (column 12). 
More specifically, there is an immediate 0.217 increase in average daily standard deviation of 
returns, which is a sizeable 6% increase compared to the average daily volatility level (3.56 as 
reported in Table 3). The results thereby align with the previously reported liquidity estimates, 
where the change in the information set has the strongest effect on the first subscribers to the 
transparency enhancing software. This is further verified when studying the intensive margin of 
the gradual transparency increase (column 13) that shows an immediate effect, followed by 
smaller and non-monotonic volatility changes. 
 
Further results: Hong Kong cross-lists 
Lastly, it is of interest to push the analysis a step further by evaluating whether the Level II 
transparency-enhancing event had any influence on Chinese stocks that are cross-listed elsewhere. 
More specifically, a small sub sample of 42 Shanghai firms (and 8 Shenzhen firms) that are cross-
listed in Hong Kong, may or may not be affected by the Shanghai specific transparency change. 
This will depend on the fundamental nature of the transparency change and on how different 
liquidity measures (turnover and bid-ask spreads) are determined in the market. To clarify this 
point it is useful to discuss each liquidity measure separately. 
It has been established in this paper that the increase in turnover on Shanghai is directly 
associated with the transparency enhancing event of Level II – an event which in contrast 
provides no additional trading information on the Hong Kong order book. This observation, 
however, does not necessarily imply that the volume of Hong Kong cross-listed stocks will be 
unaffected. Specifically, volume patterns are generally not exchange specific, so this increased 
turnover effect on Shanghai is likely to spread to other markets – even if those markets are not 
directly affected by the transparency change. For example, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) present a 
model in which fragmented markets exist in equilibrium and informed traders benefit by splitting 
orders across markets.
24
 Menkveld (2008) investigates this empirically for a sample of U.S. and 
U.K. cross-listed stocks and finds that traders indeed engage in order splitting across markets. 
Thus, if there is a market specific change that increases local trading activity, this increase should 
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 See also related work on fragmented markets in Pagano (1989), Biais (1993), Bernhardt and Hughson (1997), Biais 
et al. (2000), de Frutos and Manzano (2002) and Yin (2005). 
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be transmitted to other markets as investors tend to trade in the same stock across multiple 
markets. This is likely to apply in the sample of cross-listed Chinese stocks, where the correlation 
of turnover across markets is found to be 0.91 over the sample period. In other words, the 
observed volume increase in Shanghai associated with greater transparency is likely to spill over 
to Hong Kong as well. 
In contrast, there is no reason to presume this aligned pattern also holds true for bid-ask 
spreads, since those are determined quite differently across markets. As argued above, the 
widening of bid-ask spreads is consistent with the fact that Level II software allows subscribers to 
better identify traders. However, the Level II software only provides this information for the 
Shanghai order book, whereas it is not possible to infer the identity of traders on the Hong Kong 
exchange. Thus, there is no reason for market makers to change bid-ask quotes in Hong Kong 
since the Level II software is silent on possible trader identities in the Hong Kong order book. 
This presumption is consistent with very low correlation of bid-ask spreads across markets, which 
is calculated to be only -0.02 (and not significantly different from zero) for cross-listed stocks 
over the sample period. 
In order to empirically investigate these relationships we revisit the regression framework of 
equation (5), but now employ a triple difference methodology. Namely, the effect of Level II 
(before-after difference) is compared across Shanghai and Shenzhen listed stocks (second 
difference), relative to their Hong Kong issues (third difference). More specifically, in the cross-
listing sample each firm has two observations; one from either Shanghai or Shenzhen, the other 
one from Hong Kong. The difference between these two observations is taken for each pair of 
stocks and the effect of Level II is measured for the Shanghai group relative to the Shenzhen 
group. Compared to only examining Shanghai and Hong Kong stocks before and after the 
introduction to Level II (i.e. double differencing), the advantage of employing a triple difference 
methodology (i.e. Shanghai vs. Hong Kong differences compared to Shenzhen vs. Hong Kong 
differences) is that this allows us to control for general trends in liquidity. More specifically, this 
methodology controls for the general trend in the liquidity difference between Shanghai and Hong 
Kong stocks (by assuming this trend is the same for Shenzhen vs. Hong Kong stocks).
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 Intuitively, the triple difference methodology can be thought of as measuring the  
(diff. betw. Shanghai and HK after Level II) - (diff. betw. Shenzhen and HK after Level II) 
minus 
(diff. betw. Shanghai and HK before Level II) - (diff. betw. Shenzhen and HK before Level II). 
In technical terms, this can more precisely be written as the general regression equation  
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for each stock exchange e{SH,SZ,HK} where the dummy variable takes the value of one for Shanghai listed 
stocks. We can write the difference between Shanghai and Hong Kong observations as 
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The estimates are reported in columns 14-15 of Table 8. In short, the results are as expected. 
First, there is no statistical difference in variation in turnover between the pair of stocks that are 
issued both in Shanghai and Hong Kong. The absence of statistical difference suggests that 
turnover has also increased for Hong Kong cross-listed stocks as a result of the transparency 
change. In other words, the increase in turnover for Shanghai listed firms (established in e.g. 
section 3.2) has also spilled over to the Hong Kong market among cross-listed firms, consistent 
with the predictions of existing literature. Also as expected, spreads react differently in the two 
markets. The previously established result of wider bid-ask spreads is only observed in the 
Shanghai market for cross-listed firms, as indicated by the significantly positive difference in 
column 15. This conforms to the idea that bid-ask spreads widen in Shanghai as trader 
identification becomes feasible, in contrast to Hong Kong where no such transparency change 
takes place and thus there is no apparent reason for changed bid-ask quotes in Hong Kong. 
 
4 Concluding remarks 
 
It is established that an increase in trade transparency on the Shanghai Stock Exchange has led 
to increased trading activity among Shanghai (and Hong Kong cross-listed) stocks. Although 
increased trading activity is generally associated with narrower bid-ask spreads, the contrary holds 
true within the setting of this study. More precisely, broker anonymity and more informed trading 
results in wider bid-ask spreads, which contradicts the frequent policy claim that ‘more is better’ 
when setting the level of trade transparency. In other words, the conclusion that more 
transparency can be detrimental to market quality has in fact been actively ignored by policy 
makers who have generally pushed for more transparency whenever markets have turned, in the 
honest belief that only in “exceptional circumstances … transparency sometimes hurts the 
customer” (Wall Street Journal, 2010). 
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where no subscription software is available. Writing these two equations in one, we get the regression equation  
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for exchanges e{SH,SZ}. Thus, we regress the difference in liquidity measures on the number of subscribers 
(replacing g(·) with a three-step function), firm fixed effects, week fixed effects and other potential controls. As 
such, the model is intuitively the same as before, except the liquidity for each stock is measured as the difference 
between its Shanghai (or Shenzhen) value and its Hong Kong value. 
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These overall effects are the strongest immediately following the transparency change, 
suggesting a significant impact on institutional traders subscribing relatively early. Additionally, 
there is evidence of changed trading behavior (fewer trades carrying more volume) and alterations 
in other market outcomes besides liquidity, such as increased volatility. Thus, the transparency 
impact is wide reaching and with counter-acting welfare implications. In other words, even if high 
transparency may generate a more just market and less opaqueness surrounding trading intentions, 
it cannot be concluded that it is necessarily welfare improving.  
To further complicate policy intervention, it is established that liquidity does not react 
monotonically to increasing levels of transparency (cf. Figure 2), implying that there may be no 
‘one-size-fits-all’ policy available. More specifically, the incremental effect of increased 
transparency depends heavily on the degree of transparency already in the system. This indicates 
that a policy recommendation beneficial in one country may be detrimental to another. 
To summarize, the results provide noteworthy policy considerations by revealing that the 
effect of increased transparency i) may be detrimental to the market and ii) highly sensitive to the 
existing level of transparency. From a policy standpoint, these two results are of value given the 
seemingly unshaken and contrasting policy expectation of better market outcomes with more 
trade transparency. Instead, the findings suggest that the merits of transparency altering policies 
must be evaluated in relation to pre-existing transparency levels within the each setting. Finally, 
the result that different outcomes are likely with different starting points of transparency has not 
been previously documented in the empirical literature – and can further reconcile its opposing 
results since every empirical analysis is bound to evaluate transparency effects relative to a 
regime already in place in the corresponding market. 
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Figure 1.   Difference in liquidity across exchanges  
 
The figure displays the difference in liquidity measures across the two exchanges over time. More precisely, the trend 
reflects the liquidity differences of Shanghai listed firms versus Shenzhen listed, where the sample is restricted on 
firms listed on either exchange before September 2000 and originating from outside the two cities. Turnover and 
spread are measured as defined in the summary statistics (Table 3). The vertical line represents the date the 
transparency enhancing software was introduced. 
 
 
Turnover 
 
Spread 
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Figure 2.   Relationship between transparency and liquidity 
 
The figures show the liquidity benefit of increasing the degree of market-wide transparency (number of Level 2 
subscribers).  The figures are produced by estimating the non-linear relationships between each outcome variable and 
the number of Level 2 subscribers, which is fully described in equations 3 and 4 in section 3.4. The relationships are 
shown for Shanghai firms that are listed before September 2000 and located outside the two cities. More specifically, 
the figure shows the variation in liquidity on Shanghai beyond the average variation in liquidity across all firms on 
either Shanghai or Shenzhen exchange – which is achieved by applying firm and week fixed effects. Also plotted is 
the average level of liquidity for different ranges of transparency (ranges of software subscribers) in order to highlight 
the overall pattern of the flexible functional form (these averages are established from regression equation 5). More 
precisely, the average level of liquidity is shown for 0 and 100,000 subscribers, then for 100,000-200,000 subscribers 
and lastly for more than 200,000 subscribers. The figures include 90% and 95% confidence intervals for these 
average levels of liquidity at different ranges of subscribers (different stages of transparency). 
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Figure 3.   Chinese stock prices vs. S&P500 
 
The figure displays the evolution of stock price indexes in China and the U.S. in 2000-2010. The Chinese indexes are 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen all composite indexes, whereas the S&P500 represents the U.S. market. For comparison 
purposes, each index has been set to a value of 100 in January 2000. Source: Datastream. 
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Table 1.   Transparency changes 
 
The table summarizes the pre- and post-trade transparency changes that took place with the introduction of the Level 
II data package on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The Level II data and the accompanying software were introduced 
in August 2006 and could be obtained by any trader at a cost of approximately $200 p.a. 
 
  
Pre-trade transparency increases 1. Volume of individual requests/offers is 
detailed, which helps infer trader 
characteristics. 
2. Best 10 bid-ask quotes openly reported, 
rather than merely the top 5. 
3. Bid/ask withdrawals shown for the 10 
companies with most withdrawals (no 
withdrawals previously reported). 
  
Post-trade transparency increases 4. Screen reporting transactions updated 
every 3 seconds instead of every 6 sec. 
5. Every transaction in the past 3 seconds 
reported, not only total trading in the last 
6 seconds. 
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Table 2.   Market and trading characteristics 
 
The table summarizes the key market and trading characteristics of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. A few additions 
should be noted to Panel A. First (*), there is after hours trading. Block trades are permitted at 15:00-15:30, where trades are 
negotiated between brokers off market at prices which must be between the day‘s high and low prices. Price, volume and trader 
identification are released to the market after the close of this trading session. Second (**), neither of the exchanges have 
designated market makers and they offer only limit orders for the continuous auction, which thereby are the only source of liquidity 
(no market-, stop market-, stop limit-, fill or kill-, IOC nor incomplete orders). The order validity period is at maximum 1 day. The 
same applies to the call auction (i.e. no market orders, market-on-open orders nor market-on-close orders). Third (***), the call 
auction design is such that there is 10 minute pre-open period reserved for the call auction. There is neither order non-cancellation 
period nor any volatility/imbalance extension. Panel B shows the trading costs associated with trading in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges. All trading costs are a percentage of transaction value. Through the commissions the brokers collect all listed 
levies (supervision fee, transfer fee and transaction fee). The transfer fee is imposed by the depository and clearinghouse, which is 
50/50 owned by the two exchanges. Source: Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2007, 2008), Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006), The 
Handbook of World Stock, Derivative and Commodity Exchanges (2004-2010), China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook 
(2002-2012), websites of the two stock exchanges, Ministry of Commerce and other Chinese government websites listed in Panel B. 
The direct website links to relevant subpages are readily available upon request (due to their length the short version is reported). 
 
Panel A: Trading structure 
 
Trading hours 9:30-11:30 & 13:00-15:00* 
Trading mechanism Electronic, consolidated open limit order book (COLOB) ** 
Continuous auction 
Market opening: Call auction*** 
Market closing: No call auction 
Priority rules Continuous trading: Price-time 
Call auction trading: Price-time 
Tick size A shares: RMB 1c 
B shares: USD 0.001 or HKD 0.01 
Price variation controls Stock prices may fluctuate within a range of ±10% of the previous closing price and in 
opening call auction orders can only be submitted within this range. 
 
Panel B: Trading costs 
 
Fee Description Level and changes  Online source: 
Stamp duty Imposed by tax 
authorities. 
Stamp duty has ranged from 0.1-0.3% of transaction 
value in the sample period, but the level has been the 
same across venues at any given point in time. More 
specifically, stamp duty changed three times (in Jan. 
2005, May 2007 and April 2008), where the change 
was always simultaneous and of equal size across 
the two stock exchanges. 
gov.cn 
csrc.gov.cn 
 
Commissions Imposed and 
collected by broker. 
Maximum level of 0.3% of transaction value on both 
exchanges since May 2002. This level includes 
levies listed below and is collected via commissions. 
people.com.cn 
csrc.gov.cn 
Other levies  
(coll. via commissions): 
   
- supervision fee Imposed by China 
Securities Regulatory 
Commission. 
0.004% of transaction value for both exchanges 
during 2003-2012. 
gov.gn 
mofcom.gov.cn 
csrc.gov.cn 
- transfer fee Imposed by China 
Securities Depository 
and Clearing Corp. 
Shanghai: Unchanged level of 0.1% in 1998-2012. 
Shenzhen: Collected as part of the transaction fee 
(0.00255%) and unchanged up until 2012. 
chinaclear.cn 
sse.com.cn 
 
- transaction fee Imposed by stock 
exchanges. 
Shanghai: Unchanged level of 0.011% in sample 
period. Shenzhen: Unchanged level of 0.01475% in 
sample period (0.0122% net of the transfer fee). 
crsc.gov.cn 
szse.cn 
china.org.cn 
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Table 3.   Summary statistics 
 
This table reports total number of firms and means of firm variables (with standard deviations in parentheses) over 
the Jan. 2004 – Aug. 2009 period. The table shows summary statistics separately for the original (total) sample and 
the subsample which is restricted on firms listed before September 2000 and originating from outside the two cities of 
Shanghai and Shenzhen. The reported returns are the average daily returns (all daily averages are reported on a 
weekly frequency in the dataset). Volatility is measured as the average daily standard deviation in price over the past 
20 business days with non-missing observations. Spread is the difference between closing bid and ask prices divided 
by the midquote (and scaled by 100 to be interpreted in percentages). Turnover is the weekly average of the number 
of shares traded per day as a ratio of the total number of shares outstanding for each particular firm. Assets are the 
average value of total assets at the time of listing (time invariant). Similarly, employees are the average number of 
employees at time of listing. 
 
 
 Original sample Working sample (pre-2000 and non-local) 
 All firms Shanghai Shenzhen All firms Shanghai Shenzhen 
No. of firms 1594 844 750 767 370 397 
Returns (%) 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 
 (1.99) (1.97) (2.02) (2.02) (2.01) (2.02) 
Volatility (%) 3.56 3.51 3.63 3.57 3.56 3.59 
 (1.73) (1.74) (1.72) (1.79) (1.78) (1.80) 
Spread (%) 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.25 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Turnover (%) 1.40 1.38 1.44 1.43 1.42 1.43 
 (1.46) (1.46) (1.45) (1.51) (1.52) (1.50) 
Assets 
(¥ millions) 
256 305 180 201 214 188 
(543) (665) (240) (316) (377) (242) 
Employees 3,263 3,807 2,415 2,778 2,865 2,694 
 (17,279) (21,953) (3,431) (4,219) (4,895) (3,441) 
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Table 4.   Comparison of treatment and control group 
 
The regressions in this table fit an exchange specific flexible time trend (a 3rd order polynomial) to the dependent 
variable over the pre-event period (January 2004 - July 2006). This allows the evaluation of whether the time trends 
are different for the two exchanges before the transparency changes are introduced. Panel A compares Shanghai listed 
firms to those listed in Shenzhen. Panel B repeats Panel A, but restricting on firms listed on either exchange before 
September 2000 and also on firms originating from outside the two cities. The regressions include firm and week 
fixed effects, where the latter controls for joint trends across the two markets. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses and are clustered by firm and week, i.e. taking into account that i) the errors for the same firm may not be 
independent across time and ii) that in any given week the errors may not be independent across firms. Significance is 
reported at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. The exact coefficient (st.error) values on the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 order 
terms in column (2) are -6.8E-5 (2.5E-5) and 8.2E-8 (3.1E-8). Also reported in the last row of the table is the   - 
statistics (and the corresponding p-value) testing the joint significance of the three interaction terms, where the 5% 
critical value is 5.99 with two degrees of freedom. This    is approximately equivalent to the corresponding F 
distribution in large samples. 
 
 
  Panel A:  
Shanghai vs. Shenzhen – all firms 
 Panel B:  
Shanghai vs. Shenzhen - firms 
listed before Sept.2000 & located 
outside the two cities 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  Turnover Spread  Turnover Spread 
t*Shanghai  -0.017 0.018***  0.052 0.012 
  (0.034) (0.007)  (0.038) (0.009) 
t
2
*Shanghai  0.000 -0.000***  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
t
3
*Shanghai  -0.000 0.000***  0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Firm FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Week FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  162,868 162,868  93,679 93,679 
No. of firms  1,346 1,346  767 767 
R-squared  0.328 0.163  0.360 0.178 
  -statistics &   8.09 7.19  2.06 3.54 
       (p-value)  (0.02) (0.03)  (0.36) (0.17) 
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Table 5.   Overall liquidity effect of increased transparency (extensive margin) 
 
The table shows the average level of change in liquidity for associated with the introduction of the Level II software. 
Specifically, the table reports estimates of equation (2) where the effect is averaged out for the entire range of Level II 
subscribers. The results reflect the differences of Shanghai listed firms versus Shenzhen listed, where the sample is 
restricted on firms listed on either exchange before September 2000 and originating from outside the two cities. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by firm and week, i.e. taking into account that i) 
the errors for the same firm may not be independent across time and ii) that in any given week the errors may not be 
independent across firms. Significance is reported at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level.  
 
 
 Turnover Spread 
 (1) (2) 
   
DLevel II  (Subscribers>0) 0.121** 0.017*** 
 (0.058) (0.005) 
Observations 198,297 198,297 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes 
Week fixed effect Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.519 0.386 
Number of firms 767 767 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
43 
 
Table 6.   Immediate liquidity impact (early subscribers) 
 
The table shows the average level of change in liquidity (Panel A-B) and trading behavior (Panel C) associated with 
the introduction of the Level II software. In all panels the sample period is six months before and after the 
introduction of Level II. All reported results show the differences of Shanghai listed firms versus Shenzhen listed, 
where the sample is restricted on firms listed on either exchange before September 2000 and originating from outside 
the two cities. Panel A shows the results from a standard event-study, without controlling for other relevant variables, 
using conventional t-tests. Each t-test is based on approximately 8-9 thousand observations. It should be noted that 
figures in Panel A do not always perfectly add up, which is due to rounding (not rounding errors). Significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level is established for a t-statistics of value 1.645, 1.960 and 2.576, respectively. Panels B and C 
report multivariate regression estimates of equation (2). In Panel C the number of trades is defined within a trading 
day for each stock. Trade size is the average value traded in Chinese Yuan (normalized to 2006 value) within a 
trading day for each stock. Both of these variables are averaged weekly to maintain consistency in the data frequency 
throughout paper. All other variables are defined as in the summary statistics in Table 3. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are clustered by firm and week, i.e. taking into account that i) the errors for the same firm 
may not be independent across time and ii) that in any given week the errors may not be independent across firms. 
Significance is reported at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level in Panels B and C. 
 
Panel A: Univariate liquidity analysis 
 
 Pre-Level II Post-Level II Diff. t-value  
Turnover 
     
   Shanghai 1.32 1.69 0.37 19.13  
   Shenzhen 1.46 1.71    0.25 12.94  
   0.12 4.25  
Spread      
   Shanghai 0.31 0.27 -0.04 -20.11  
   Shenzhen 0.31 0.25  -0.06 -29.16  
   0.02 4.71  
 
Panel B: Multivariate liquidity analysis 
 
 Turnover Spread 
 (1) (2) 
   
DLevel II  (Subscribers>0) 0.105** 0.014*** 
 (0.041) (0.004) 
   
Observations 
Firm fixed effects 
Week fixed effects 
32,774 
Yes 
Yes 
32,774 
Yes 
Yes 
R-squared 0.502 0.632 
Number of firms 764 764 
 
Panel C: Multivariate analysis on trading behavior 
 
 No. of trades Trade size Ln(No. of trades) Ln(Trade size) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
DLevel II  (Subscribers>0) -59.4*** 9,633*** -0.058** 0.150*** 
 (19.4) (3,161) (0.026) (0.031) 
     
Observations 
Firm fixed effects 
Week fixed effects 
26,093 
Yes 
Yes 
26,093 
Yes 
Yes 
26,093 
Yes 
Yes 
26,093 
Yes 
Yes 
R-squared 0.759 0.231 0.780 0.820 
Number of firms 763 763 763 763 
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Table 7.   Effect of gradually increasing transparency access (intensive margin) 
 
The table shows the average level of liquidity for different ranges of transparency (ranges of software subscribers), as 
further illustrated in Figure 2. More precisely, the average level of liquidity is shown for 0-100,000 subscribers, then 
for 100,000-200,000 subscribers and lastly for more than 200,000 subscribers. The difference in the average level of 
liquidity between different intervals of subscribers (levels of transparency) is also reported. Specifically, the table 
reports dummy coefficient estimates of equation (5), along with the statistical difference of those estimates. The 
results reflect the differences of Shanghai listed firms versus Shenzhen listed, where the sample is restricted on firms 
listed on either exchange before September 2000 and originating from outside the two cities. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis and are clustered by firm and week, i.e. taking into account that i) the errors for the same 
firm may not be independent across time and ii) that in any given week the errors may not be independent across 
firms. Significance is reported at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
 
 
 Turnover Spread 
 (1) (2) 
   
D1(0<Subscribers<100,000) 0.021 0.019*** 
 (0.042) (0.005) 
D2 (100,000<Subscribers<200,000) 0.120* 0.022*** 
 (0.062) (0.006) 
D3 (200,000<Subscribers) 0.180** 0.016*** 
 (0.082) (0.006) 
Observations 198,297 198,297 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes 
Week fixed effect Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.520 0.386 
Number of firms 767 767 
   
D2 – D1 0.098 0.004 
 (0.073) (0.004) 
D3 – D2 0.060 -0.007 
 (0.089) (0.005) 
D3 – D1 0.159** -0.003 
 (0.081) (0.005) 
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Table 8.   Robustness and further results 
 
The table shows further tests and extensions of previously establish results.  First (columns 1-2), the linear 
relationship between liquidity and transparency is estimated by running the regression yit = α + β(Subscribersit) + fit + 
wt + γZit + εit, using the standard notation, where the number of subscribers is measured in hundreds of thousands. 
Second (columns 3-4), a log-log regression model of the form ln(yit) = α + βln(Subscribersit) + fit + wt + γZit is 
evaluated. Third, (columns 5-6), the marginal effect of increased transparency is estimated separately for the three 
intervals of software subscribers (using three slope function, rather than a three step function – see details in equation 
(8)). Fourth (columns 7-8), the Jan.2007–Dec.2008 boom-bust period (also coinciding with the operation of another 
transparency enhancing software named TopView) is excluded from the analysis. Fifth (columns 9-10), potentially 
endogenous market variables are controlled for by adding them to the benchmark model of equation (5). Sixth 
(columns 11-13), the key analysis of the paper is repeated using volatility as the outcome variable, as defined in the 
summary statistics in Table 3.  Finally (columns 14-15), the liquidity effect on stocks of firms listed both in Shanghai 
and Hong Kong is examined (relative to effect on stocks of firms listed both in Shenzhen and Hong Kong – i.e. triple 
differencing). In columns (1)-(13) the results reflect the differences of Shanghai listed firms versus Shenzhen listed, 
where the sample is restricted on firms listed on either exchange before September 2000 and originating from outside 
the two cities. In all columns, robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered by firm and week, 
i.e. taking into account that i) the errors for the same firm may not be independent across time and ii) that in any 
given week the errors may not be independent across firms. Significance is reported at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) level.  
 
 
Panel A: Functional form and data restrictions 
 Linear  Log-log  3 slopes  Excl. 2007-08 
 Turnover Spread  Ln(Turn.) Ln(Spr.)  Turnover Spread  Turnover Spread 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
Subscribers 0.073** 0.005**          
 (0.031) (0.002)          
Ln(Subscribers+1)    0.012** 0.001***       
    (0.006) (0.000)       
D1 (0<Subscr.<100’)       0.046 0.017***  0.031 0.019*** 
       (0.046) (0.006)  (0.040) (0.006) 
D2 (100’<Subscr.<200’)       -0.283* 0.032**    
       (0.155) (0.013)    
D3 (200’<Subscr.)       0.143 0.058***  0.173** 0.016** 
       (0.313) (0.018)  (0.084) (0.006) 
Subsc.·D1(0<Subsc.<100’)       -0.156* 0.015*    
       (0.088) (0.008)    
Subsc.·D2(100’<Subsc.<200’)       0.210** -0.002    
       (0.107) (0.008)    
Subsc.·D3 (200’<Subsc.)       0.013 -0.017**    
       (0.130) (0.007)    
            
Observations 198,297 198,297  198,297 198,297  198,297 198,297  164,221 164,221 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Week fixed effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.520 0.386  0.520 0.386  0.520 0.386  0.526 0.378 
Number of firms 767 767  767 767  767 767  767 767 
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…Table 8 continued. 
 
Panel B: Market factors and further results 
 Market factors  Volatility impact  Hong Kong 
 Turnover Spread  Extensive Immediate Intensive  Turnover Spread 
 (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13)  (14) (15) 
          
DLevel II  (Subscribers>0)    0.095** 0.217***     
    (0.042) (0.068)     
D1 (0<Subscr.<100’) 0.017 0.019***    0.093*  -0.003 0.181* 
 (0.038) (0.005)    (0.054)  (0.225) (0.098) 
D2 (100’<Subscr.<200’) 0.125** 0.024***    0.063  -0.251 0.546*** 
 (0.051) (0.006)    (0.081)  (0.370) (0.204) 
D3 (200’<Subscr.) 0.172** 0.018***    0.097*  -0.370 0.256** 
 (0.079) (0.006)    (0.050)  (0.654) (0.126) 
Turnover  -0.013***        
  (0.001)        
Spread -0.911***         
 (0.068)         
Volatility 0.233*** -0.004***        
 (0.011) (0.001)        
          
Observations 197,881 197,881  197,881 32,774 197,881  9,395 9,393 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Week fixed effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.568 0.397  0.517 0.401 0.517  0.249 0.189 
Number of firms 767 767  767 764 767  50 50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
